From Vocalism to Nominalism:
Progression in Abaelard's Theory of Signification

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In the present paper, I propose to analyse Abaelard's theory of signification with reference to his evolution from vocalism (or so called early nominalism) to nominalism in the strict sense. I shall examine (1) how the vocalist theory is defined and criticized by Abaelard in his *Glossae* on Porphyry's *Isagoge* with the incipit "*Ingredientibus*",[1] (2) how he revises the vocalist theory in answering objections, and (3) how his later *sermo*-theory in his another gloss on Porphyry, entitled *Glossulae super Porphyrium* and distinguished by the incipit "*Nostrorum petitioni sociorum*",[2] is different from that of the *Glossae 'I'*. In other words, I suppose three stages in Abaelard's discussion: the first stage is the vocalist definition of universals in the *Glossae 'I'*, which is his starting-point in it; the second is Abaelard's revision of vocalist theory of signification in the *Glossae 'I'*; and the third is the *sermo*-theory in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*, which is a further revision of vocalism, but deserves to be called nominalism, and not vocalism any longer. That is, Abaelard's change in terminology from *vox* to *sermo* involves a revision in his basic conception of word itself.[3]

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[1] This gloss is placed with other three glosses in *Logica 'Ingredientibus'* edited by Geyer, so that I shall use the abbreviation '*LI*' when referring to the edition; nevertheless I agree with Mews[1985: 77], when he says, "it seems more prudent to speak only in terms of those glosses which survive, rather than of this hypothetical 'Logica'", and shall call this gloss itself *Glossae 'I'*.

[2] While using the abbreviation '*LNPS*' for Geyer's edition, I shall call this gloss *Glossulae 'NPS'* by the same reason as mentioned in Note 1 above.

[3] C. Mews [1987: 16-17] evaluates that this "change in terminology, while not a major shift in his understandings of a universal, allowed Abaelard to clarify the distinction between a word as a physical sound and as a signifying agent". I do not intend entirely to oppose this evaluation, but to show that Abaelard's shift implies more than Mews thinks. On the other hand, Peter King [1982: 288-301] denies that Abaelard changed his views about universals from the *Glossae 'I'* to the *Glossu-*

1   THE VOCALIST THEORY
AS ABAELARD'S STARTING POINT

In the *Glossae 'I'*, after raising the problem of universals and refuting the realist theories, Abaelard introduces the position which "ascribes universality of this kind[4] only to vocables (*voces*)"(*LI* 16,21-22). The name "nominalism" has been applied to this position, but rather "vocalism" may be appropriate, for those, including Abaelard, who took such position were called *vocales* at that time[5] and this position is distinguished, e.g. by John of Salisbury, from later nominalism.[6] We can regard the position as the starting-point of Abaelard's theory in the *Glossae 'I'*. For, though he goes on to point out certain difficulties or weak points in it, he does not agree with the supposed difficulties, but resolves them by revising the vocalist theory; Abaelard's discussion reflects something of the evolution of his thought in relation to vocalism; at the least it reflects his view that his theory can be better presented as a developed vocalist theory than as any previously existing theory. Therefore let us first examine how Abaelard understands the vocalist theory when he defines universals in terms of names or vocal sounds, and when he points out its difficulties.

1.1   THE VOCALIST DEFINITION OF A UNIVERSAL

Abaelard's version of the vocalist theory defines "universal" as follows:

(A) A universal word is that which, from its first formulation, is appropriately predicated of many things individually; e.g. the name 'man' is attachable to particular names of men according to the nature of the things (i.e. the subjects) on which the name is imposed. A singular word, by contrast, is that which is capable of

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lae '*NPS*', by examining Abaelard's usage of *vox* and *sermo*. However, the following discussion shall show what is the point of Abaelard's revision.

[4]By "universality of this kind (*huiusmodi*)", Abaelard refers to the characteristic of being predicated of many (i.e. *LI* 16,20).

[5]Iwakuma[1992].

[6]*Policraticus* VII 12, PL 199, 665A. John presumably thinks of Abaelard's theory in the *Glossulae 'NPS'* when he refers to the people who "*solis nominibus inhaerentes, quod rebus et intellectibus subtrahunt, sermonibus ascribunt*"; hence he presumably calls them "*nominales*" in contrast to *vocales* to whom he refers here as "*qui voces ipsas genera dicerent esse et species*". Cf. Reiners[1910: 52-53].

being predicated of only one individual: e.g. Socrates, insofar as this is understood as the name of only one individual.[7]

This definition is based on Aristotle's definition of a universal as

that which is fitted by nature to be predicated of many things (*quod de pluribus natum est aptum praedicari*: *LI* 9,19),[8]

which Abaelard has quoted in the preceding passages of the *Glossae 'I'* with Porphyry's definition of a singular as "that which is predicated of only one thing (*quod de uno solo praedicatur* : *LI* 9,20)".

Hence the following points should be noted: firstly in Aristotle's definition, "being fitted to be predicated of many things" is said to be a characteristic "by nature (*natum est*)", i.e. a *born* characteristic. This is interpreted by Abaelard to mean that the characteristic originates in, and depends on, the word's *inventio*, i.e. its first formulation. The *inventio* of a name is its *impositio* on the basis of the discovery of a grouping in the nature of things (cf. *LI* 20,14; 23,22); a vocable (*vox*) is imposed as the name of certain things, which in turn are said to be its "subjects".

Secondly, corresponding to Aristotle's "fitted (*aptum*) to be predicated of many things", Abaelard says "appropriately predicated (*habile praedicari*) of ....", and again "attachable (*conjungibile*) to ....". In the definition of a singular, Abaelard changes Porphyry's expression, "is predicated (*praedicatur*)", into "is capable of being predicated (*praedicabile est*)". This revision might seem to be negligible, but a consistent idea underlies it. For the expression "*praedicabile*" is in accordance with "*aptum praedicari*" and "*habile praedicari*". That is, a universal is a universal (or a singular is a singular) even when it is not actually

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[7]*LI* 16,25-30: Est autem universale vocabulum quod de pluribus singillatim habile est ex inventione sua praedicari, ut hoc nomen 'homo', quod particularibus nominibus hominum conjungibile est secundum subjectarum rerum naturam quibus est impositum. Singulare vero est quod de uno solo praedicabile est, ut Socrates, cum unius tantum nomen accipitur.

[8]Cf. Aristotle, *De Int.* 17a39. To be fair, according to Boethius' translation the definition lacks "aptum" and only says " ... natum est praedicari." Although Abaelard sometimes exactly follows the translation (*LI* 9,25; *LNPS* 512,15; 522,15), he often adds 'aptum' to it (*LI* 19,19; 402,2; Gl.sec.voc.147,11; *LNPS* 512,17; 534,10), a word taken from the definition in Boethius' *In Cat. Arist.*(PL 64, 170B, cf. *LNPS* 534,9). Presumably he wants to make Aristotle's definition to accord with his theory.

predicated, provided it has the capability, or characteristic, of being predicated.

Finally, Abaelard explains that a predication describes an actual state of affairs of a thing(*rei status*) so that in the case of predication we attach one name to another not freely, but "according to the nature of the things (*secundum rerum naturam*) that are the subjects of the name imposed"(cf. *LI* 17,12-28). Thus he refers to the relationship between names and their subjects which makes the predication possible and appropriate no matter whether it is performed actually or not; the capacity for predication is considered in terms of the existing relationship between names and things. This relationship is called "*nominatio*", a name's function of being the name of something, and is said to originate in the *impositio* or *inventio* of names. Thus, Abaelard understands "'P' can be predicated of 'S'" as "'P' is a name of S"; this relationship between a name and its subjects exists because of its imposition even when the name is not actually predicated.[9]

From these observations, we can state the characteristics of Abaelard's position in passage (A): 1) the characteristic that makes some names, or vocables, universals and others singulars is based on the name-things relationship, i.e. *nominatio*;[10] 2) a name, or a vocable, becomes the name of something(s) by its *impositio*, which seems to be understood as a historical event.[11]

Thus by using Aristotle's definition of a universal ("*natum aptum est praedicari ...*"), and not Porphyry's definition of a genus ("*quod praedicatur ...*"), Abaelard introduces *impositio* and *nominatio* into the discussion on universals. Historically speaking, I suppose that Abaelard has received the theory of *impositio* and *nominatio* from previously existing vocalism,[12] but formalized by himself the vocalist theory as an

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[9]Consequently the naive nominalist definition can be said not to cover empty names. We shall see later in passage (D) that Abaelard is aware of this characteristic.

[10]Note that when Abaelard explains the mode of predication by adding "individually (*singillatim*)" in passage (A), he also indicates something concerning this relationship. That is, a universal is not predicated of (i.e. not a name of) many things confusedly and in one stroke, as in "these things are men" or " 'men' is a name of these things", but individually, i.e. one by one, as in "Socrates is a man, Plato is a man etc." or " 'man' is a name of Socrates and of Plato, etc."

[11]De Rijk [1986: 85] refers to it as a historical event, while Peter King [1982: 113,334-337] denies such interpretation.

[12]We may say further:"from earlier grammatical theory". Mews[1992] refers to the anonymous *Glosule* on books I-XVI of Priscian's *Institutiones grammaticae* from

interpretation of Aristotle's definition. As to the latter point, Abaelard follows Aristotle's definition in the *Glossae 'I'* even when he refers to Porphyry's definition of a genus (*LI* 36,4-8), so does he also in the corresponding passages of other glosses after this gloss (Gl.sec.voc. 147,10-15; *LNPS* 522,15; 534,7-10,36-7). By contrast, Abaelard did not refer to Aristotle's definition in *Editio super Porphyrium* and *Dialectica*, but uses only that of Porphyry (*Editio.* 9,20-35; *Dial.* 538,29-31).[13] Thus there must be a progression in Abaelard's use of Aristotle's definition[14] and it is presumably Abaelard's originality to introduce Aristotle's theory of predication. However, this is only his starting-point in the *Glossae 'I'*.

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the late eleventh century and shows how its author is concerned with *impositio, inventio,* and *nominatio* with reference to Priscian's phrase, "proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare." According to Mews[1992: 18] as well as De Rijk[1967: 228n], the author explains thus: "Notandum est tamen quod nomen non significat substantiam et qualitatem insimul nuncupative, ..., sed substantiam *nominat* tantum, quia ei fuit *impositum,* qualitatem vero *significat* non nuncupative, immo representando et determinando circa substantiam ... Quare omne nomen *duas* habet *significationes*: ..., ut 'homo' *per impositionem significat* rem Socratem et ceterorum hominum, id est *nominando,* determinans circa illa rationalitatem et mortalitatem et hoc representando." Mews argues that Roscelin owes his understanding of language as a whole to the *Glosule.* he sees earlier vocalism as influenced by the *Glosule's* grammatical theory.

[13]As to the dating of Abaelard's writings, I follow Mews[1985]. That is, the suggested chronological sequence for his writings which are referred to in the present paper is as follows:

Editio super Porphyrium, ..., Editio super Aristotelem de interpretatione etc.

Dialectica

Glossae 'I'

Glossae super Praedicamenta

Glossae super Peri ermenias

Glossae super Porphyrium secundum vocales

Tractatus de Intellectibus

Glossulae 'NPS'.

See also Mews[1984] in regard to the authenticity of *Gl.sec.voc.*

[14]Another evidence for the progression can be recognized in *Positio Vocum Sententia* (*PVocS*), which Iwakuma [1992] ascribes to Abaelard. Here the author makes use of Aristotle's in order to explain Porphyry's definition of genus. However, *PVocS* lacks an interpretation concerning "*natum aptum est ...*", though it contains passages that are closely related to the *Glossae 'I'* (*LI* 16,19-17,28). In passages from the *Glossulae 'NPS'* (*LNPS* 534.7-), which are more closely related to *PVocS*, Abaelard also applies Aristotle's universal to Porphyry's genus and indicates that "*natum est praedicari*" is equivalent to "*veraciter conjungi habet*" (*LNPS* 535,15,38); this interpretation differs not only from passage (A) quoted above from the *Glossae 'I'* but also from the *Glossulae* (*LNPS* 522,15-19).

1.2   Two Difficulties of Vocalism

Now we come to the second stage; after thus defining the vocalist position, Abaelard also sums up its difficulties as follows:

(B) Concerning these universals the questions were stated already, for they are in doubt especially in respect of their signification; since (1) they do not seem to have any thing as their subject (2) nor to produce a sound understanding of anything.[15]

Here Abaelard raises the two cardinal aspects of signification[16] in examining the vocalist theory "concerning these universals", i.e. *voces universales* (*LI* 18,5): (1) whether a universal name is connected with a certain thing which is the subject of the name; (2) whether it produces an act of understanding of a certain thing. By "the questions already stated", he refers to those which at the beginning of his argument he added to the three questions explicitly expounded by Boethius; he states that there are many difficulties besides Boethius' three, for instance:

(C) (1) the difficulty concerning the common cause of *impositio* of universal names: what the cause is; namely, what it is in accordance with which different things come together; or (2) that concerning the understanding of [i.e. produced by] universal names, for by such understanding nothing seems to be conceived nor does any thing seem to be dealt with by means of a universal vocable.[17]

Abaelard formulated his own question out of these difficulties and added it as a fourth question to Boethius' three:

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[15]*LI* 18,6-9: De quibus universalibus positae fuerant quaestiones, quia maxime de earum significatione dubitatur, cum neque rem subiectam aliquam videantur habere nec de aliquo intellectum sanum constituere.

[16]Also De Rijk [1967: 193; 1986: 86] has pointed out the two aspects in Abaelard, though my distinction of the two aspects is not entirely in agreement with his.

[17]*LI* 8,12-16: illa de communi causa impositionis universalium nominum quae ipsa sit, secundum quod scilicet res diversae conveniunt, vel illa etiam de intellectu universalium nominum, quo nulla res concepi videtur nec de aliqua re agi per universalem vocem.

The last part of this passage (*videtur ... nec de aliqua re agi per universalem vocem*) is also concerned with understanding, because if a vocable is not concerned with something, it cannot produce an understanding of the thing. Cf. *Dial.* 112,31: de eo enim vox intellectum facere non potest de quo in sententia eius non agitur.

(D) Whether (1) it is necessary for both genera and species, as long as they are genera and species, to have some thing as their subject in regard to their function of naming, or (2) even when the subject-things named are destroyed, each of them can remain a universal by virtue of its signifying function in respect of understanding, e.g. the name 'rose', when there is not a single example of the roses to which the name is common.[18]

In these passages Abaelard distinguishes Aspect 1 and Aspect 2, which I have marked (1) and (2) in passages (B), (C), and (D). Under Aspect 1 he considers *nominatio* (the function of naming), i.e. the name's function of being a name of something(s), or the relationship of a name to the things of which it is the name, and also *impositio*, whereby originally the name is established. Under Aspect 2 he is concerned with the *intellectus*, i.e. the intellection or the act of understanding (*LI* 20,29-31) that a name produces.

In his *Dialectica* Abaelard distinguishes the two aspects as well, when he refers to the modes, or meanings, of signification. A name's function of producing an act of understanding, is the *significatio* in the strict sense ("*prima et propria*"), while its function of naming based on the *impositio* the *significatio* in the broader sense ("*large*", cf. Dial. 562,21-563,22).[19]

Thus when Abaelard demonstrates the difficulties of the vocalist theory of *significatio* (in the broad sense), he does this under both aspects: when he states in summary in passage (B) that universal vocables seem "not to involve any thing as the subject" and then argues further in detail (*LI* 18,9-16), he is concerned with *nominatio* and *impositio*; when he states in summary that they seem "not to produce a sound understanding of anything" and then argues in detail (*LI* 18,17-19,6), he pays attention to the aspect of *significatio* in the strict sense.

As to Aspect 1 the problem is: What is a universal vocable the name

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[18]*LI* 8,18-22: utrum et genera et species, quamdiu genera et species sunt, necesse sit subiectam per nominationem rem aliquam habere an ipsis quoque nominatis rebus destructis ex significatione intellectus tunc quoque possit universale consistere, ut hoc nomen 'rosa', quando nulla est rosarum quibus commune sit.

[19]Abaelard refers to the two modes of signification also as *per impositionem*, and as *per generationem*(*Dial.* 111,27-112,13). In addition, signification in the broader sense corresponds to Priscian's statement that a noun *signifies* a substance and a quality, while signification in the strict sense to the comment in the *Glosule* on Priscian that a noun names a substance but *signifies* a quality, as quoted in note 12 above.

of (*LI* 18,9-16)? If we answer that, for instance, 'man' is the name of this man (say Socrates) and that man (say Plato), and so on, we shall be asked further: Why is 'man' the name of Socrates, Plato, and certain other beings, but not of this cat (say Henry)? In answering this, we cannot say that 'man' is imposed as the name of Socrates, and also as the name of Plato, and so on, for it would follow that 'man' is not common to the singulars but is applied to them equivocally (cf. *LI* 18,12-14). Here if we admitted the realist theory, we could answer as follows: there is a thing (*res*) that is, in a sense, common to certain singulars, e.g. a thing is common to both Socrates and Plato (but not to Henry), and 'man' is imposed as the name of this thing. As a vocalist, however, Abaelard disagrees with this solution, and hence for him there is no thing that is common to these singulars (cf. *LI* 18,14-15). Thus there seems to be nothing common to singulars and therefore nothing that is the subject of a universal name.

As to Aspect 2, the point is as follows: when we hear a statement that contains the word 'man', it is very often the case that we cannot understand who is referred to by the statement. E.g. suppose that someone states "there is a man sitting in this house" referring to Socrates, then if we only hear the statement, we cannot understand by 'man' Socrates, nor any other man, nor all men. Thus 'man' does not produce an understanding of any individual in the hearer's mind. Understanding, however, cannot be without its object; every understanding is an understanding of something. Therefore, 'man' cannot produce any understanding in the hearer (*LI* 18,17-19,6). Note that here Abaelard is not concerned with the intellection or the produced act of understanding itself, but with it in relation to its subjects; "understanding of what, or which," is now put in question.

The refutation under Aspect 1 straightforwardly contradicts the vocalist view; here Abaelard uses the terms and conceptions ready to hand in the vocalist's definition of universals. By contrast, Aspect 2 is not found in the vocalist's view nor in the realists' views that Abaelard has referred to; it must be the new point that Abaelard has introduced into the argument.[20] Of course the aspect has its origin in Aristotle's defini-

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[20]To be fair, the earlier grammatical theory had the view that a noun names a substance but signifies a quality as quoted in note 12 above. In discussion Mews has suggested that vocalism takes its emphasis on genus and species naming individuals, while Abaelard looks more closely at genus and species signifying a quality. I agree with him so far. The point I highlight here, however, is that even though Abaelard's

tion of signification, i.e. to produce an understanding (*constituere intel-lectum*).[21] Therefore we have to say that he has applied this traditional idea of signification to the discussion on universals and used it to refute the naive vocalist position. However, it is he who adopts such terms as *nominatio* and *significatio* (in the strict sense), and makes them the two cardinal aspects of his theory of signification (in the broader sense). Thus by identifying difficulties under both aspects, Abaelard prepares the ground for his own theory.

Now, what is the crucial difference between the two aspects?

When we consider the *nominatio* in general, we think of ourselves as being in a position to apprehend both the name and the subjects separately and then to apprehend the relationship between them, saying that such and such a vocable is the name of such and such things. Moreover, the relationship *nominatio* of a particular vocable to things is thought to be independent of man's actual understanding of the vocable; the relationship is established and therefore the vocable is definitely a name of certain things whether or not I actually know the vocable's relationship to the things. Hence it is natural that Abaelard is concerned with the origin of this relationship, i.e. with *impositio* of names, which is required to be presupposed as the cause or reason of the existing relationship.

Thus, under Aspect 1, the theory of *nominatio* justifies the objectivity of semantics independently of the personal understanding of each word. It lacks, however, any account of how one can use the objective language according to the established rule of the language; this is the point that the second aspect is concerned with.

Under Aspect 2, Abaelard considers the *significatio* (in the strict sense) of a vocable, i.e. its act of producing *intellectus* (an act of understanding) in a hearer's mind. A man's personal understanding when he hears the vocable becomes the subject of analysis.

Even though the *nominatio* of a vocable is in the act, if a man cannot understand when he hears it, it is of no use to him; thus Abaelard understands *significatio* as a *sine qua non* function of a vocable. However, *significatio* cannot stand by itself without a certain relationship between

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theory of signification under Aspect 2 corresponds to the grammatical theory of a noun's signifying a quality, the origin of Aspect 2 itself is not in the grammatical thoery.

[21] *De Int.* cap. 3, 16b20.

vocables and things, i.e. Aspect 1, but is based on it. For, if we did not base ourselves on Aspect 1, we would have no criterion as to whether an act of understanding actually caused in a hearer is correct or not. In other words, in order to reach the conclusion that each instance of *significatio* is not merely subjective or private, there has to be a theory that presents an objective or public base for it.[22] These two aspects are, in my view, thus very important not only for Abaelard but also for those who intend philosophically to analyse the nature of language.

Note that *significatio* is so far an act that happens intermittently and not continuously, i.e. exists only at every moment at which the vocable is heard. This characteristic of signification is unique in the *Glossae 'I'* and worth attending to; for Abaelard revises this theory again after the *Glossae 'I'*, as we shall argue later with reference to the *Glossulae 'NPS'*.

2   Abaelard's Revision of Vocalism   in the *Glossae 'I'*

2.1   Signifying Things and Producing Understanding

Though Abaelard propounds the difficulties of naive vocalism, he never agrees with them, but replies by solving the difficulties. At the beginning of his reply, he summarizes his theory:

(E) However what is said above is not the case. For universal words in a sense signify different things by their function of naming; not, however, by producing the understanding which rises from the things, but one which pertains to the singulars. For instance, not only is the vocable 'man' the name of singulars on the basis of common cause (namely that they are men), by virtue of which the name is said to be a universal, but also it produces a certain common, and not proper, understanding; namely, this understanding pertains to singular men, of whom it conceives the common likeness.[23]

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[22]De Rijk [1967: 196,202-3], however, thinks that, maintaining Aspect 1, Abaelard "fails to free himself from non-logical views." I shall argue this point with reference to Ockham as well as Abaelard elsewhere.

[23]*LI* 19,7-13: Sed non est ita. Nam et res diversas per nominationem quoddammodo significant. non constituendo tamen intellectum de eis surgentem, sed ad singulas pertinentem. Ut haec vox 'homo' et singulos nominat ex communi causa, quod scilicet homines sunt, propter quam universale dicitur, et intellectum quen-

It is clear in these passages that Abaelard refers to the two aspects. Regarding Aspect 1, which is concerned with the name-things relationship, he does not agree with the objection that there is nothing with reference to which a vocable is imposed as the name of certain things, but replies that there is something common to those things of which a universal vocable is the name, and that this something common is the cause of a common name's imposition, though this something is not a thing (*res*), but a fact such as that each of them is a man. Thus Abaelard admits that the common cause is to be explained (*LI* 19,14-16), and proceeds to explain in detail (*LI* 19,21-20,14).

Regarding Aspect 2, i.e. in respect of signification as the act of producing intellection, Abaelard opposes the preceding objection that a vocable cannot produce any understanding in a hearer; he claims in passage (E) that it produces "not the understanding which rises from the things, but one which pertains to the singulars", or which "conceives the common likeness of things". Hence he puts forward the main question under Aspect 2 in the passage that follows passage (E) (*LI* 19, 16-17), and then proceeds to discuss it in detail (*LI* 20,15-22,24).

Thus we can recognize in passage (E) the following points. Firstly, Abaelard never admits the validity of the difficulties he himself has raised, but the discussion begun in (E) is nothing other than his reply to and solution of them;[24] we should notice his brief, but decisive, statement against the raised difficulties: "*sed non est ita*" (however what is said above is not the case).

Secondly, there are two ways in which a name "signifies", or denotes, things (*significare res diversas*): one is by *nominatio*; the other is through *constituere intellectum*. To recognize this point clearly, the first sentence of (E) should be carefully interpreted:

> (voces universales) et res diversas quoddammodo significant
> per nominationem. non constituendo tamen intellectum de
> eis surgentem, sed ad singulas pertinentem.

The sentence is composed of the following two claims:

Nr: Each universal word in a sense signifies different things by its function of being their name.

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dam constituit communem, non proprium, ad singulos scilicet pertinentem, quorum communem concipit similitudinem.

[24]Tweedale[1976: 162-164] as well as Sikes[1932: 103] misses this point.

> *Sr*: Each universal word signifies different things, not by producing the act of understanding which rises from them, but which pertains to them.

That is, the passage implies that *"res diversas significant"* is used in the first claim with the broad sense of *"significare"* (hence *"quoddammodo"*), and then used also in its strict sense for the second claim; in other words, *"res diversas significant"* is implicitly repeated before *"non constituendo"* but with another sense. Thus by *Nr* and *Sr* Abaelard replies separately to the difficulties of each aspects. The main reason why we should thus read the passage is that in this context Abaelard clearly distinguishes two aspects and therefore it is inappropriate that he should add both *"per nominationem"* and *"constituendo intellectum"* simultaneously to qualify one and the same verb *"significant"*.[25]

   Consequently, there are three kinds of signification in respect of its objects:

1. the first mode of *significatio rerum*: this is the act of denoting things by *nominatio* (*"significatio"* is used in its broader sense); *Nr* refers to this mode.

2. the second mode of *significatio rerum*: this is the act of *signifying* (i.e. denoting or indicating) things through the medium of the intellection that is produced by a vocable;[26] *Sr* refers to this mode.

3. *significatio intellectus*: the act of producing an act of understanding, which is considered as the object of the signification. This mode is implied in *Sr*.

In addition, we can find a third object (besides things and understandings) of signification in the later part of Abaelard's discussion (*LI* 22,25-26; 24,25-30),[27] i.e. :

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[25]This point is the *sine qua non* of the present interpretation; we might do well without the idea of implicit repeat of *"singificant"*. I have chosen, however, this idea so that the interpretation can be consistent with *LI* 307,28, in which *Sr* alone is indicated as *"res significant constituendo intellectum"*.

[26]De Rijk[1967: 190-196], as well as Tweedale[1976: 133-211], misses this mode, so that they seem to understand every example of *"significatio rerum"* as the first mode. King[1982: 330-334] also seems to deny this mode (or a "trianglar semantics") by evaluating the first mode as "direct reference"

[27]About what Abaelard says in *LI* 24,25-30, I am in agreement with the revised

    4. *significare formam*: to *signify* (i.e. to indicate) or to designate (*designare*) the form towards which an *intellectus* (act of understanding) is directed.

The first kind of signification is concerned with Aspect 1, the other three with Aspect 2; objects are things in 1 and 2, the act of understanding in 3, and the form, or mental image, in 4.

    Thus "*significare*" is used in various ways. However, all of them will be rendered by the English 'to *signify*' in the present article, qualifying the term as the context requires, in order to avoid misunderstanding that might result from complicated translation.

2.2   *NOMINATIO* and *SIGNIFICATIO RERUM*

Of the four modes of signification shown in the preceding subsection, I shall show an example of the first two in the following discussion, which takes a contrary position to that of Tweedale and others.[28]

    Let us examine the following passage from the *Glossae 'I'*:

(F) Hence when I hear 'man', a certain figure rises in my mind, which relates to singular men in such a way that it is common to all of them and not peculiar to any of them. By contrast, when I hear 'Socrates', a certain form rises to mind, which represents the likeness of a particular person. Hence by this word, i.e. 'Socrates', which brings to mind a form peculiar to one thing, a certain thing is singled out and fixed. In contrast, with the term 'man', the understanding of which rests upon a form common to all [men], this commonness makes an indiscriminate situation, so that we do not understand any [particular] thing among all [men]. Hence 'man' is not said directly to denote (*significare*) Socrates nor any

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explanation by Tweedale[1987: 8], and not with De Rijk[1985: 92-93]. With De Rijk[1980: 144], we can say concerning the subject of discussion, "Next he (Abaelard) asks (*LI* 22,25 ff.) whether these forms are not also signified by nouns." Accordingly, it is natural that in the concluding passage (*LI* 24,25-30) Abaelard replies affirmatively to the question and hence concludes, "now we have reached besides things and understandings" (i.e. besides *significatio rerum* and *significatio intellectus*) "the third signification of names"(i.e. the *significatio* the object of which is the form). By contrast, I cannot understand what sort of context is understood when the passage is translated, "we have got besides *thing* and *understanding* the signification of names as a third entitiy"(De Rijk[1980: 146]).

[28]The following discussion is also concerned with interpretations by Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli[1969], De Rijk[1967] and others.

other [particular] man; for no one is singled out by force of the
name, though it names the singulars. By contrast, 'Socrates', or
every proper name, is not only in a position to name something,
but also to fix the thing that is the subject.[29]

Tweedale uses a sentence from these passages to show the distinction
between *significatio* and *nominatio* (or *appellatio*, which he translates
as "denoting"). According to him, Abaelard admits that "it (i.e. 'man')
denotes anything which is in fact a man", while denying that "it signifies
any of these items." He explains further that "it signifies" the non-
sensible property, viz. rationality "without denoting", while "it denotes
the sensible men without signifying", by quoting also the passage in the
Glossulae (*LNPS* 527,23-29).[30] Such an interpretation, however, about
how Abaelard contrasts *significatio* and *nominatio* cannot be justified.

In my view, when Abaelard says in passage (F):

neque Socratem neque alium recte significare 'homo' dicitur,
cum nullus ex vi nominis certificetur, cum tamen singulos
nominet;

he contrasts the manner of a universal word's *signifying* things with its
being a name of existent things (i.e. *nominatio*). He does not admit
that 'man' does not *signify* anything, but that it does not "*signify* di-
rectly Socrates nor any other (particular) man.", i.e. it does not produce
the understanding that pertains "directly" to any particular man,[31] so
that "no one is singled out (*certificari*)" by 'man'. This is what he ex-
plains in the preceding passage in (F); "a figure" (towards which the

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[29]*LI* 21,32-22.6: Unde cum audio 'homo', quoddam instar in animo surgit, quod
ad singulos homines sic se habet, ut omnium sit commune et nullius proprium. Cum
autem audio 'Socrates', forma quaedam in animo surgit, quae certae personae simili-
tudinem exprimit. Unde per hoc vocabulum, quod est Socrates, quod propriam unius
formam ingerit in animo, res quaedam certificatur et determinatur, per 'homo' vero,
cuius intelligentia in communi forma omnium nititur, ipsa communitas confusioni est,
ne quam ex omnibus intelligamus. Unde neque Socrates neque alium recte significare
'homo' dicitur, cum nullus ex vi nominis certificetur, cum tamen singulos nominet.
Socrates vero vel quodlibet singulare non solum habet nominare, verum etiam rem
subiectam determinare.

[30]Tweedale[1976: 165]. De Rijk[1967: 192] also refers to these passages, in order to
show the *nominatio*; my present discussion also contradicts his. Concerning *LNPS*
527,23-29, see my interpretation of passage (O) below.

[31]Thus I read "*recte*" with "*significare*", and not with "*dicitur*" as Tweedale [1976:
165] does.

understanding produced by 'man' is directed) "relates to singular men in such a way that it is common to all of them and not peculiar to any of them (*ad singulos homines sic se habet, ut omnium sit commune et nullius proprium*)." This characteristic of being "common to all and not peculiar to any" is presented not only as the reason why no particular man is singled out, as is claimed in the presentation of the difficulties (*LI* 18,27-30), but also as the reason why Abaelard can disagree with the claim under Aspect 2 that " 'man' seems to *signify* nothing (*nullum significare videtur*), for it does not produce an understanding of any thing (*de nulla re constituat intellectum*; *LI* 18,37-19,2)" and can state that it "*signifies* things by producing the understanding that pertains to singulars (*LI* 19,7-9)."[32] In this sense Abaelard admits that a universal name *signifies* things by means of the act of understanding it produces, i.e. via the form, or the figure towards which the act of understanding is directed and which is common to all of them and not peculiar to any of them.

On the other hand, when he says that " 'man' names the singulars (*singulos nominat*)", he refers to the name's relationship to things independently of the actual understanding one has when one hears it. 'Man' is the name of Socrates as well as of other men, whether we recognize it or not; nevertheless he never says that it is particularly the name of a certain thing, but that:

(G) even if they [i.e. universal names] name those [i.e. function as the names of those] that are discrete, they do not do so in discrete and determinate fashion.[33]

A proper name is the name of a particular thing and, when the name is given, the subject-thing is uniquely fixed. A universal name, on the contrary, is the name of many things and is not unique to one thing; the name indeterminately relates to the things.

2.3 *IMPOSITIO* AND *SIGNIFICATIO RERUM*

A name's function of naming (*nominatio*) is independent of its *significatio intellectus*, i.e. of what the hearer understands by the name or

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[32]See the discussion in 2.1

[33]*LI* 29,6-7: etsi ea quae discreta sunt, nominent, non tamen discrete et determinate. He also uses "*confuse*" for "not in discrete and determinate fashion"(*LI* 29,3).

whether he understands it. Nevertheless it does not always function as a name of something, for it lacks the function when all the subject-things named are destroyed. By contrast, it is always in a position to produce a certain act of understanding in hearers independently of things' actual existence. Thus *nominatio* and *significatio rerum* are not necessary functions of terms, while *significatio intellectus* is said to be permanent (cf *LI* 309,5-11).

Though *nominatio* is to be understood thus, Aspect 1, which is concerned with the relationship between words and things, continues to be the basis of Abaelard's semantics as well as Aspect 2. It is not *nominatio* but *impositio* which plays an important role; *significatio*, the act of producing an intellection, also rests on *impositio*. Hence, as we have already seen, in replying to the difficulty under Aspect 1, Abaelard considers the common cause of *impositio*; his vocalist definition of universals (passage (A)) is an interpretation of Aristotle's definition in terms of the imposition of universal names. That is, the name 'rose' cannot exist as a name without having been imposed. Consequently it is neccessary that roses existed when the name 'rose' was imposed as the name of those roses.[34] Thus Abaelard's theory demands the actual relationship between names and things that existed at least when the names were imposed, though after the names have once been established, they can continue to be the names without the existence of any exemplars, i.e. without their function of being the names of things (*nominatio*).

Thus *impositio* under Aspect 1 and *significatio intellectus* under Aspect 2 become the cardinal components of Abaelard's semantics. This point is remarkable if we compare it with the vocalist theory of universals, which we have regarded as Abaelard's starting point; it consists of *nominatio*, which supports a vocable's predicability of many things, and *impositio*, which is the origin of such predicability.

Then, can we conclude that by this change Abaelard has shifted his position from vocalism to another one that might properly be called nominalism? Historically speaking, there is a piece of evidence that Abaelard's theory in the *Glossae 'I'* was called "*vocalium sententia*".[35] Theoretically speaking, the answer to the question depends on how we define vocalism (and nominalism). At least, however, we can conclude

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[34] As to how a name is imposed by the *inventor*, see: *LI* 20,14; 23,22-24; 112,33-36. Though later Abaelard refers to 'chimaera' (e.g. *LNPS* 528,17; 533,7), which does not exist nor has existed ever, he shows no theory to explain its imposition insofar as in the *Glossae 'I'*.

that Abaelard is still a vocalist in that he considers *significatio* under Aspect 2 to be an act that occurs at intervals, i.e. every time a vocable is uttered and heard. That is, in the *Glossae 'I'* the subject of *significatio* is appropriately said to be a vocable (*vox*), not only because Abaelard actually uses this term, following the example of vocalists, but also because he thinks of it as a temporary being that exists only when someone utters it;[36] he thinks so even when he refers to it as "*sermo*".

3   Nominalism in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*

In this last section, I shall be concerned with the final stage of Abaelard's theory in relation to vocalism, and analyse the theoretical implication when Abaelard claims in the *Glossulae 'NPS'* that *sermones*, not *voces*, are universals. Since in the *Glossae 'I'* he allowed that a *vox* is a universal, Abaelard's claim in the *Glossulae 'NPS'* constitutes a revision, which, I think, relates to the revision in his framework of Aspect 1 and 2.

3.1   The Institution and Existence of *Sermones*

When Abaelard introduces *sermones* as universals in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*, he also uses Aristotle's definition of a universal as well as in the *Glossae 'I'*:

(H) Thus, we say that certain words (*sermones*) are universals, for they are in a position to be predicated of many things from birth, i.e. from (*or* by virtue of) their institution by human beings.[37]

Here "they are in a position to be predicated ... from their institution (*habent praedicari ... ex institutione*)" corresponds to Aristotle's "*(aptum) natum est praedicari*". Abaelard's way of interpreting Aristotle's definition may not seem, as a whole, different from that of the *Glossae 'I'* (i.e. passage (A)). His revision here, however, firstly points out that it is *sermones*, and not *voces* that have their origin in establishment by human beings; the origin of *voces*, on the contrary, is said to

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[36]This conclusion may be historically confirmed by Anselm's comment on Roscelin concerning the temporality of the *vox* as the subject of *nominatio*. For "*flatum vocis*" seems to mean nothing but a temporary being (Anselm, *De incarnatione verbi*, ed. Schmitt, *Anselmi Opera Omnia* II 9,22). As to the relationship of the comment to Roscelin's view in terms of grammar and theology, see also Mews[1992].

[37]*LNPS* 522,28-30: Sic ergo sermones universales esse dicimus, cum ex nativitate, id est ex hominum institutione, praedicari de pluribus habeant.

be the creation itself (*LNPS* 522,16-21). So far we can state this point in other words: that which the *inventor* instituted is not the type of vocal sounds itself, but the relationship of a certain type of vocal sounds to something else.

From Impositio to Institutio

Now what is this something else? Is it the case also in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*, like the theory of *impositio* in the *Glossae 'I'*, that the relationship is between a type of vocal sounds and certain things of which the vocal type can be predicated? There is, however, an evidence that prevents us from answering affirmatively: the existence of certain things is not necessarily required for the institution of a *sermo*, for Abaelard now admits that '*chimaera*' is a word and makes sense, though *chimaera* does not exist nor has existed ever (*LNPS* 533,7; *Tr. de int.* 96,5-26).[38] Then what could have been instituted when the word '*chimaera*' was instituted? So far only one possibility is the relationship between a certain type of vocal sounds and a certain *intellectus*, or a certain form towards which an *intellectus* is directed.[39] Thus we can understand the passage (H) as that a universal word's predicability of many things is generally based on the relationship instituted between a certain type of vocal sounds and a certain *intellectus* (or a certain form), so that the *significatio rerum* as the act of signifying things through the medium of the intellection has become the basis for Abaelard's interpretation of Aristotle's definition of universals.

That Abaelard uses "*institutio*" in terms of *significatio* in the strict sense, and not of *nominatio*, is confirmed by examining the usage of "*institutio*", "*instituere*", "*impositio*" and "*imponere*" in his writings upto the *Glossulae 'NPS'*. In his *Glossae super Peri ermenias*, which is concerned with *significatio intellectus* according to Abaelard, *voces* were said to have been instituted in order to "*significare, hoc est intellectum constituere*" (*LI* 309.21; 335.31,34,38; 336.1,2,5,12,etc.). In this context Abaelard used *institutio* and not *impositio*. There is the same usage of "*instituere*" also in *Tractatus de intellectibus* (*Tr. de int.* 46,13), in which Abaelard does not use "*impositio*" at all. By contrast in his

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[38]Cf. note 34.

[39]So far I say that "a certain *intellectus or* a certain form." It shall be argued, however, in the rest of this paper that the *intellectus* is identified with the form in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*.

Glossae super Praedicamenta, which is said to be concerned with *significatio rerum*,[40] Abaelard used "*impositio*" to explain the origin of the relationship between a vocable and things of which the vocable is a name in the case of first imposition, or between a vocable and names (i.e. other vocables) in the case of second imposition (*LI* 112.5-28).

Again, there were instances in which terms of imposition and of institution seemed to be used mixed, nevertheless there was a distinction of usage between the two groups. In the *Glossae super Praedicamenta*, Abaelard used "*instituere*" once in the context of imposition referred to above, and a similar mixture of the terms of imposition and of institution was in *Glossae super Porphyrium secundum vocales* as well. We can recognize, however, a distinction between the two in those context; "*instituere*" was used as "ad significationem rerum voces institutae fuerunt" (*LI* 112.13), or "vocabula propter rerum doctrinam videntur esse instituta" (*Gl.sec.voc.* 126.16) and so on; while "*impositio*", or "*imponere*", as "secundum primam nominum impositionem, quae rebus facta est" and "secunda impositio, secundum quam ipsae voces aliis nominibus sunt appellatae"(*LI* 112.10,18), or "vocabula 'homo' et 'animal' etc. de personis subiectis quibus imposita fuerunt" and "esse ipsas personas quibus imposita fuerunt genera et species"(*Gl.sec.voc.* 126.11,20). Thus *instituere* was used with reference to the purpose of a word's formulation, while *imponere etc.* with reference to things of which the vocable is a name.[41]

Accordingly it is presumable that Abaelard does not speak of the imposition in his explanation of Aristotle's definition in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*, because the original relationship between words and existent things is not necessary for a word's formulation, and that he comes to think of the signification in the strict sense as the purpose of the formulation, so the institution becomes appropriately referred to as the origin of a word's signifying function. If this presumption is correct, Abaelard should be said to have revised his theory also in this respect from the theory of *impositio* in the *Glossae 'I'* to that of *institutio* in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*, and this conclusion shall be confirmed further through our

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[40]Here, in my view, *significatio* is used in the broader sense.

[41]To there is an exceptional usage of "*imponere*" in *Gl.sec.voc.* There Abaelard interpreted Porpyry's first question, "utrum genera et species ......sint posita intellectibus" as "sunt imposita propter intellectus"(127.27). In the corresponding passage in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*, however, this "*imposita*" is replaced by "*posita*" according to Geyer's edition (526.11). This may be another evidence of Abaelard's revision in this respect.

later examination of the conception of *intellectus* in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*.

With passage (H) Abaelard also revises his theory in that he no longer refers to *nominatio*. When he says that a *sermo* is "in a position to be predicated of many things", he does not explain it in terms of the relationship of the *sermo* to things that actually exists as he did in passage (A) of the *Glossae 'I'*. That is, the predicability of a *sermo* is supported by its *institutio*, and not by *nominatio* any longer; the signifying function of a word is based on its institution in the past, and not on its present relationship with things.

Hence I suspect that Abaelard has come to hesitate about maintaining his former conclusion that 'rose' is no longer a universal in the case that no rose exists (*LI* 30,1-5; 31,35-32,12).[42] For if he still maintains this point, he has to admit that the term's predicability is supported by its actual relationship with things, and not only by its institution in the past. While admitting that neither 'Phoenix', of which always only one instance exists, nor 'Chimaera', of which no instance exists nor existed ever, is a universal, Abaelard does not give an explicit answer in the case of 'rose' (*LNPS* 528,13-18). This lack of answer may suggest his hesitation. Again, we can compare this passage with the corresponding passage of *Gl.sec.voc.*, in which after answering negatively in the case of Phoenix, Abaelard presumably answered positively in the case of rose in terms of the *intellectus*.[43]

From Temporary Vocal Sounds to Permanent Words

Abaelard further argues the dependence of *sermo*'s existence on its institution:

(I) Note that genera and species still exist even if no one is speaking. For when I say , "A genus or a species exists", I attribute nothing

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[42]Thinking that Abaelard maintains his former conclusion, P.King[1982: 500] argues that Abaelard is not consistent in this respect. I agree with him about what should be Abaelard's conclusion.

[43]I say "presumably", because the MS actually says "*non*" and the answer is negative but this "*non*" does not accord with the context but seems to be superfluous and the answer must be positive: "Unde phenix universale non est, cum plures non contineat personas. Similiter hoc nomen 'rosa', omnis rosis destructis vel una sola permanente, [non] est universale ex intellectu, sed non ex re." (*Gl.sec.voc.* 132.18-21) It seems to be natural to read this sentence, putting off the "[non]", as Ottaviano did and as Iwakuma does in his edition of this part which he is preparing.

to it, but indicate the institution that has been made already, as said above.[44]

That is, *sermones* exist even if there is no actual utterance of a vocable (*vox*); they exist without any speaker or hearer. Here "a *sermo* exists" means "the *sermo* has been instituted". Thus the existence of a *sermo* rests only on the historical event of its institution; we may say that Abaelard posits a new realm of existence for words other than in actual vocal sounds.

In addition, we must examine passage (I) with regard to another claim of Abaelard: each *sermo* is a *vox* (*LNPS* 522,30). Why can each *sermo* be a *vox*, when no one is speaking? We can answer this as follows: at least in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*, a *vox* is not an actual vocal sound, but a type of vocal sound, which exists even when no one is speaking. This answer is also based on the claim that the origin of *voces* is the creation; that which was created cannot be individual vocal sounds uttered now and then, but so to speak a readiness for them. Hence, after the manner of passage (I), we can conclude that when Abaelard says, "*vox* exists", he attributes nothing to it, but indicates the creation that has been done already. That is, *voces* are not temporary any longer in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*.

Thus Aspect 1, under which *nominatio* and *impositio* were considered, has been reduced under the influence of Aspect 2, under which *significatio*, or the word's producing the intellection in a hearer's mind, was the subject. This revision, however, seems to affect Aspect 2 itself.

3.2 Intellection and Imagination

In the *Glossae 'I'* words' acts of *signifying* were performed at intervals whenever they were uttered and heard. Also forms towards which acts of understanding were directed seem temporary; at least they were present to the hearer at intervals. By contrast, in the *Glossulae 'NPS'* both *intellectus* and *forma* seem constantly to exist as well as *sermo*. I shall show this change and its reason through the examination of Abaelard's writings below.

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[44]*LNPS* 524,21-24: sciendum est genera et species nullo loquente non minus esse. Cum enim dico: genus vel species est, ipsis nihil attribuo, sed institutionem iam factam, ut superius dictum est, ostendo.

Imagination and Abstraction in the Glossae 'I'

We can find two modes of mental conception in the *Glossae 'I'*. As we have already seen, when Abaelard introduced *significatio*, the act of producing an intellection when a hearer hears a certain vocable, he interpreted the intellection in terms of mental images. That is, *similitudo rerum* was "an *instar* (figure)", "a *forma*" (see passage (F) above) or "*res imaginaria*", toward which an *intellectus* was said to be directed(*LI* 20,31). Thus the common likeness of things was a mental image, though *intellectus*, and not imagination, was said to be directed toward this imagenary likeness.

   After thus interpreting *intellectus* in terms of mental images, however, Abaelard additionally introduces a theory of abstraction, of which he is presumably reminded by his preceding argument concerning whether also the object form of an intellection is that which a name signifies. In the argument Abaelard referred to conceptions in God's mind, which were said to be *per abstractionem*, comparing them with exemplars in a craftsman's mind (*LI* 22.34-23.7). In the context of abstraction theory, an *intellectus* of a universal is said to result by the act of abstraction, by which for instance 'man' is understood as a "rational mortal animal".

   (J) ... let us go back to the intellection of a universal, which necessarily comes into being always by abstraction. For instance, when I hear 'man' or 'whiteness' or 'white (thing)', I am not reminded, by virtue of the name, of all the natures or properties that are in the subject things, but, in the case of 'man', only of (natures and properties such as) animal and rational mortal; nor have I then any conception of other subordained accidental properties, but a confused, and not discrete, conception. Also an intellection of a singular comes into being by abstraction; this is the case when someone speaks, for instance: 'this substance', 'this body', 'this animal', 'this man', 'this whiteness' or 'this white (thing)'. That is, by 'this man' on one hand, I attend only to the nature of man, though concerning a certain subject; by 'man' on the other hand, I attend simply to that nature itself, and not concerning anyone among men.[45]

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[45]*LI* 27,18-29: ad intellectus universalium redeamus, quos semper per abstractionem fieri necesse est. Nam cum audio 'homo' vel 'albedo' vel 'album', non omnium naturarum vel proprietatum, quae in rebus subiectis sunt, ex vi nominis recordor, sed

Hence Abaelard goes on to explain how an intellect of a universal is said by Porphyry to be "*solus, nudus, purus.*"

The difference between passage (F) and (J) is apparent. Both are concerned with what results when I hear 'man', but the former says that a certain figure which is common to all men and not peculiar to any men rises in my mind, while the latter that I have the conception of rational mortal animal. Let us call the former the imagination theory, and the latter the definition, or abstraction, theory.

There are not, however, any remarks on the relationship between these two modes of intellect, and thus both modes are only put side by side in the *Glossae 'I'*.

It is notable that this side-by-side-ness is not peculiar to Abaelard. For Anselm also recognized these two modes when he shows *per corporis imaginem* and *per rationem* as the two modes of speaking natural words (*verba naturalia*) in *Monologion* cap.10, i.e., in the context of explaining forms of things in the Creator's mind before creation comparing them with ideas in a craftsman.

> . . . [I speak of a man] when my mind beholds him . . . by an image of the body, that is, when my mind imagines his sensible figure; while by the definition, that is, when my mind thinks of his universal being, which is "rational mortal animal."[46]

After thus referring both to "*corporis imago*" and to "*ratio*", Anselm calls them on one hand "*verba naturalia*" according to Augustine, and identifies them on the other hand with Aristotelian-Boethian "*passiones animae*", for he describes them as likeness (*similitudo*) of things and as same for all races.[47] When Anselm refers to the formulation of conventional words (*alia omnia verba propter haec sunt inventa*), he presumably thinks of Aristotle's "*secundum placitum*" and its Boethius' interpretation (*secundum hominum positionem*)[48] on one hand, and Adam's

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tantum per 'homo' animalis et rationalis mortalis, non etiam posteriorum accidentium conceptionem habeo, confusam tamen, non discretam. Nam et intellectus singularium per abstractionem fiunt, cum scilicet dicitur: 'haec substantia', 'hoc corpus', 'hoc animal', 'hic homo', 'haec albedo', 'hoc album'. Nam per 'hic homo' naturam tantum hominis, sed circa certum subjectum attendo, per 'homo' vero illam eandem simpliciter quidem in se, non circa aliquem de hominibus.

[46]ed. Schmitt, *op.cit.*, I 25.4-9.
[47]ed. Schmitt, *op.cit.*, I 25.11-21.
[48]PL 64, 297C; 301D.

naming of animals in *Gen.*2 as well as God's naming of day and night
in *Gen.*1 on the other hand.

Thus already by Anselm "*imago*" and "*ratio*" were taken as the two
modes of mental conception, after which conventional words had been
formulated. These two modes were put side by side by Anselm, as well
as by Abaelard. The two modes have presumably been among things
Abaelard has received from his predecessors.

As to Abaelard, the context of the *Glossae 'I'* suggests that Abae-
lard started explaining his revised vocalism with the imagination theory
of *intellectus*, then became aware of the abstraction theory, but left the
two theories standing side by side without consistency. Abaelard's re-
marks on these theories before and after the *Glossae 'I'* deserve further
scrutiny.

From Imagination to Abstraction

In Abaelard's logical works reportedly written written earlier than the
Glossae 'I',[49] the two theories are recognized independently of each other,
and not side by side.

In *Editio super Aristotelem de interpretatione*, *similitudo* is inter-
preted as *imaginatio* and the act of intellections seems to be an imagi-
nation:

(K) these passions in the mind, i.e. intellections are likenesses, i.e.
    imaginations, for by intellections we imagine how a thing is as it
    really is.[50]

Again, there is no passage where Abaelard explains *intellectus* in
terms of abstraction theory, nor *intellectus* of man in terms of rational
mortal animal.

On the other hand, in *Dialectica*, signification is interpreted with
reference to Aristotle's definition in *De Interpretatione* 3 (16b20), and
Abaelard maintained that what a man understands when he hears a
word is its essential definition and not any mental images:

(L) That is, one who utters a *dictio*, i.e., a certain significative vocable,
    constitutes an intellection in the hearer, . . . for instance 'man' with

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[49] As to the dating of Abaelard's works, see note 13.

[50] *Editio.* 74,18-20: hae passiones, id est intellectus, sunt similitudines, id est ima-
ginationes, quia intellectu imaginamur esse rei sicuti est.

> its special nature as well, i.e., the rational mortal animal. For by
> the word 'man' we only conceive "rational mortal man", and do
> not understand so much as 'Socrates'.[51]

This line of thought apparently corresponds to the abstraction theory,
and passage (J), in the *Glossae 'I'*.

Again, though there is a passage where "*similitudo*" is used in terms
of image, nevertheless it is not a relationship between a mental image
and its corresponding thing but the one between two things.[52]

In addition, even the imposition of a word is explained in terms of
its essential definition :

(M) A vocable's signification . . . is understood in many way. In one way
it becomes to be by imposition, so that 'man' signifies a rational
mortal animal, to which the name is given by imposition.[53]

Thus in the *Dialectica* we find only the abstraction (and definition)
theory.

In logical works written later than the *Glossae 'I'*, the abstraction
theory gradually becomes dominant.

Glossae super Praedicamenta is said to concern the signification of
things, and not of intellections, and there is not an appropriate reference
concerning intellection and imagination.

In the *Glossae super Peri ermenias*, Abaelard devotes a fairly de-
tailed discussion to distinguish *intellectus* from *imaginatio* as well as
from *sensus* (*LI* 313,16-318,22). The former acts with reason, while the
latter two without reason. By imagination we only confusedly appre-
hends the image of something, while by the intellection we describe
(*depingimus*) the image by attending to some natures and properties
(*LI* 317,15-20; 318,3-11). This theory is different from the imagination
theory in passage (F) of the *Glossae 'I'*, where the image itself varied

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[51]*Dial.* 562,25: idest qui dictionem profert, idest vocem aliquam significativam,
constituit intellectum in auditore, ... Ex 'hominis' enim vocabulo tantum 'animal
rationale mortale' concipimus, non etiam Socratem intelligimus.

[52]Sepe etiam ex similitudine res quedam ex aliis significantur, ut achillea statua
ipsum Achillem representat. (*Dial.* 111,21.)

[53]*Dial.* 111,27: Vocum quoque significatio, de qua intendimus, pluribus modis
accipitur. Alia namque fit per impositionem, ut '*hominis*' vocabulum *animal rationale
mortale*, cui nomen datum est per impositionem, significat, . . .

along with the intellection. That is, the image towards which the intellection of a universal was directed was a likeness which is common to all the singular things under the universal and not peculiar to any of them, while the image towards which the intellection of a singular was directed was a likeness of a particular thing. On the other hand the definition theory in the *Glossae 'I'* spoke of attending to some natures and properties as passage (J) shows. Thus the *Glossae super Peri ermenias* shows a mixture of the two theories, which were put side by side in the *Glossae 'I'*.[54]

Glossae super Porphyrium secundum vocales lacks the theory of signification in terms of mental images. By contrast it involves the theory that 'man' produces a conception of rational mortal animal (e.g. *GL.sec.voc.* 134,24).

In *Tractatus de Intellectibus*, though Abaelard admits that there cannot be any human intellections (*intellectus*) without an act of imagination (*Tr. de int.* 36,5-42,2), he analyses *intellectus* only in terms of its act of attending things' nature or property (e.g. *natura humanitatis* as *animal rationale mortale*), and not in terms of mental images of things (*Tr. de int.* 44-96). Accordingly, Aristotle's *similitudo* is re-interpreted:

(N) In *De interpretatione* Aristotle calles sound intellections likenesses (*similitudines*) of things, that is, they conceive the state of affairs of a thing as it actually is, . . . Singular intellections are sound when they accord with the actual state of things.[55]

Here *similitudo* is no longer explained in terms of relationship between mental images and their subjects, but between contents of *intellectus* and actual states of things.[56]

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[54]Thus Abaelard's theory in the *Glossae super Peri ermenias* is extremely interesting and may show us an turning point in Abaelard's progression on the point, nevertheless I cannot presently argue about it in detail and I shall do it elsewhere in the near future.

[55]*Tr. de int.* 60,12-18: Sanos intellectus Aristoteles in eodem rerum similitudines appellat, hoc est ita concipientes ut rei status sese habet, . . . Singuli intellectus, quia cum statu rerum concordant, sani sunt.

[56]I do not mean that this "*similitudo*" is used only in this sense in *Tr. de int.*; a passage shows another usage which is similar to that in the *Glossae 'I'*: "vix aliquid intellectu formare possimus, nisi ad corporalium similitudinem rerum quas sensuum experimentis didicimus." (26,5)

In the *Glossulae 'NPS'* we find almost the same tendency as in *Tr. de int.*: *intellectus* of 'man' is explained only in terms of 'animal', 'rationalitas' etc, and not in terms of (imaginary) likeness that is common to all men.

The preceding observations lead to the conclusion that Abaelard held both the imagination theory and the definition theory side by side in the *Glossae 'I'*, gradually shifted his main point to the latter theory after the gloss, and at last entirely abandoned the former theory.

From Mental Images to Intelligible Forms

Thus in the *Glossae 'I'*, although Abaelard considered things' nature or property and intellect's act of abstraction as well, at least his consideration under Aspect 2 began with the mental image that is said to be a common likeness of things. In the *Glossulae 'NPS'*, by contrast, when Abaelard refers to *forma* in terms of *intellectus*, it is no longer a kind of mental image, but is an intelligible, and not sensible or imaginable, form. This form is the proper object, or content, of an act of understanding. We can add the following point that confirms Abaelard's progression proposed above.

In answering Boethius' first and third question in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*, Abaelard uses the expression (*LNPS* 526,12; 527,25):

> significare rem non cum aliqua forma quae sensui subiaceat
> (to *signify* things, not with any form subject to sense-perception).

Very similar expressions are found in the corresponding contexts of *Gl.sec.voc.*[57] By contrast, the corresponding contexts of the *Glossae 'I'* do not contain such expressions at least explicitly (*LI* 28,3-15; 29,8-38). This fact suggests Abaelard's revision about *significare rem* by means of *intellectus*, i.e. this is done via "common likeness", i.e. via mental image, in the imagination theory of the *Glossae 'I'*, but via *forma* which is not a product of imagination but an intelligible object in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*. For instance, when he claims that:

(O) Certain genera and species ... are in a position to name (*appellare*), or to be the name of (*nominare*), sensible things, and ... are

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[57] 127,27-28; 130,10-11.

in a position to *signify* things, and yet not with any form subject
to sense-perception,...[58]

This passage is also an example of the distinction between *nominare*
and *significare rem*, which we have discussed in 2.2. That is, contrary
to some scholars' account,[59] this is the revised view of a word's *signifying*
things through the medium of intellection; the revision lies in that the
form by means of which a word signifies things is not a mental image
any longer.

3.3 *INTELLECTUS* AND *FORMA*

In the *Glossae 'I'*, *intellectus* was said not to be an imaginary form but
to be a mental act and was distinguished from the likeness of things,
in opposition to Aristotle's expression (*LI* 20,29-30; 21,1-9). However, in
the *Glossulae 'NPS'*, *intellectus* seems to be equivalent to "the contents
that are understood" and thus sometimes seem to be equivalent to the
"form". This point is confirmed by the fact that, when Abaelard intro-
duces the opinion that *intellectus* are universals in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*,
he quotes a passage from Priscian in which general and special forms
are presented and which he quoted in the *Glossae 'I'* as referring to
forms distinguished from acts of understanding (*LNPS* 513,15-19. cf. *LI*
22,25-34). This suggests that the distinction between *forma* and *intellec-
tus* in the *Glossae 'I'* becomes blurred in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*; at least
occasionally he means forms by *intellectus*. This may be a result of the
change in the meaning of *forma* referred to 3.2.

Accordingly, the distinction between the third and fourth modes of
signification in the *Glossae 'I'*, i.e. between *significatio intellectus* as the
function of producing an intellection and *significare formam* (see 2.1
above), also becomes obscure.

Abaelard's use of '*facere intellectum*' in the *Glossulae 'NPS'* in-
stead of '*constituere intellectum*' in the *Glossae 'I'* may be involved in
this change(*LNPS* 524,35-525,7; 528,33). At least Abaelard is not so much
concerned with word's temporary act of producing an intellection in the
Glossulae 'NPS' as in the *Glossae 'I'*. In other words, although he ad-
mits that *intellectus* referred to here are caused in the hearer when he

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[58]*LNPS* 527,23-29: genera et species quaedam, ...sensibilia habent appellare vel
nominare, et ...res habent significare et non cum aliqua forma quae sensui subia-
ceat, ...

[59]See note 30 above

hears certain vocal sounds, none the less the aspect of their production by the vocal sounds is of only secondary significance. Abaelard is mainly concerned with the contents of *intellectus* (and their relationship to things, or things' state of affairs). Thus, when he uses '*facere intellectum*', he seems to refer to the contents, and not to the act of understanding.

The intelligible forms, or contents, of *intellectus* are not temporary; they constantly exist whether someone understands them or not.[60] Thus *intellectus* is no longer temporary in the *Glossulae 'NPS'*. This point is presumably involved in Abaelard's shift from *voces* to *sermones*, i.e. from temporary to permanent beings.

Intellectus as Permanent Entities

On the basis of these observations, I conclude the following: though having started with *intellectus* under Aspect 2, Abaelard eventually understands *intellectus* as permanent entities as well as *sermones*,[61] by excluding the temporariness of intellections or by overlapping each of them with the form toward which it is directed; the meaning of "form" has been changed as well. This means that he does not maintain the two aspects quoted in 1.2 any longer; Aspect 1 was partly abandoned and partly absorbed into Aspect 2 so that the aspect under which he apprehends *intellectus* or *formae* is, so to speak, the revised Aspect 2.

We may reconstruct the existence of *intellectus* in the *Glossulae 'NPS'* as follows. A *sermo* exists through being in a position to produce an *intellectus*, even when the corresponding vocal sound does not exist; so does the corresponding *vox* without any actual vocal sounds. Similarly, an *intellectus*, as well as intelligible forms, exists through its relationship with a *sermo*, even when the act of understanding is not actually produced.

Conclusions

In sum, in the first stage Abaelard received the idea of *impositio* and *nominatio* from previously existing vocalism and formalized it as an interpretation of Aristotle's definition of universals. In the second stage Abaelard introduced *significatio intellectus*, or *significatio rerum* through

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[60]Of course we must be careful not to understand each form as the Platonic Idea of a kind. See De Rijk[1980: 144-146].

[61]Cf. Tweedale[1976: 209-211].

the medium of *intellectus* by basing himself on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*. Nevertheless, in this stage *significatio* is still a temporary act. Then, in the third and final stage, as a result of the revision we have discussed in this section, words and their signification are no longer temporary; in this sense Abaelard's theory in the *Glossulae 'NPS'* deserves to be called *nominalism*, for the sake of distinguishing it from *vocalism* of the *Glossae 'I'*.[62]

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PVocS: Abaelardus(?), *Positio Vocum Sententia*, ed. by Iwakuma Y. in: Iwakuma[1992] (*Traditio*, 47), 66-73.

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[62]The present article is essentially based on my Japanese articles "Abailard's Theory of Signification"(1987) and "Towards the Nominalist-Logical Point of View: Abelard's theory of *significatio*"(1993), though it also contains many revisions. Early drafts of this article were improved by the multifarious suggestions of Professor Peter Dronke, and by those of Mrs Anna Rist and Professor John Rist as to written English including philosophical and Latin terminology. One of the drafts, entitled "Abelard, vocalism, and nominalism" were read at the conference on medieval nominalism held at Madison (US) in 1991. For revisions after the conference, Iwakuma Yukio gave me many materials and drafts of his edition of some MSS, and Constans Mews checked the draft in its last stage, providing me with some useful comments.

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